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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
notice of claim to maintain such an action, the court reasoned that the
absence of such a mandate in the instant sections reflected the Legisla-
ture's intent that none be necessary.218
The instant decision, which is supported by decisional law, 219 is a
sound construction of the pertinent statutes.
GML 50-e: Infant permitted to file late notice of claim where infancy
may have been important factor in failure to timely file.
Section 50-i of the General Municipal Law permits actions in tort
against a municipality only if a notice of claim is served within ninety
days after the claim arises. Section 50-e(5) provides, inter alia, that the
court may, in its discretion, permit an infant to file a notice of claim
within a reasonable time after expiration of the ninety-day period if
he fails to serve a timely notice "by reason of" his infancy. There exists
a marked divergence within the appellate division with respect to the
level of proof required to establish the nexus between the fact of in-
fancy and the delay. The problem is further complicated when counsel
is timely retained, but a delay in filing nonetheless occurs.
The First Department has generally required that a causal rela-
tionship between the fact of infancy and the delay be demonstrated.
Where the delay is attributable to the attorney's error or inadvertence,
the statutory standard is not met.2 0 The other departments approach
the issue more liberally, presuming disability from the fact of infancy,
even where the infant's attorney has been derelict, upon a showing
that the delay was attributable in any substantial degree to infancy.2 21
217 N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 341-b (McKinney 1966); Caruso v. Incorporated Village of
Sloatsburg, 35 App. Div. 2d 988, 317 N.Y.S.2d 959 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.).
218 70 Misc. 2d at 275, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
219 Sullivan v. Whitney, 25 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1941).
220 See Clark v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 84 App.
Div. 2d 770, 311 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1st Dep't 1970) (mem.), aff'd mem., 28 N.Y.2d 614, 268
N.E.2d 803, 320 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1971); Shankman v. New York City Housing Authority, 21
App. Div. 2d 968, 252 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1st Dep't 1964) (mer.), aff'd mem., 16 N.Y.2d 500,
208 N.E.2d 175, 260 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1965); Goglas v. New York Housing Authority, 13
App. Div. 2d 939, 216 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1st Dep't 1961) (mer.), aff'd mem., 11 N.Y.2d 680,
180 N.E.2d 910, 225 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1962); Ringgold v. New York City Transit Authority,
286 App. Div. 806, 141 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Ist Dep't 1955) (mer.); Schnee v. City of New York,
285 App. Div. 1130, 141 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1st Dep't 1955) (mem.), aff'd mem., 1 N.Y.2d 697,
134 N.E.d 69, 150 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1956).
221 See Perry v. Board of Educ., 34 App. Div. 2d 1089, 312 N.YS.2d 640 (4th
Dep't 1970) (mer.); Brooks v. Rensselaer County, 34 App. Div. 2d 708, 309 N.Y.S.2d
659 (3d Dep't 1970) (mem.); Kern v. Central Free School Dist. #4, 25 App. Div.
2d 867, 270 N.Y.S.2d 137 (2d Dep't 1966) (mer.); Klee v. Board of Coop. Educ.
Servs., 25 App. Div. 2d 715, 270 N.Y.S2d 230 (4th Dep't 1966) (mer.); Spanos v.
Town of Oyster Bay, 23 App. Div. 2d 881, 259 N.Y.S.2d 917 (2d Dep't) (mem.), aff'd
mem., 16 N.Y.2d 951, 212 N.E.2d 535, 265 N.YS.2d 101 (1965); Pandoliano v. New York
City Transit Authority, 17 App. Div. 2d 951, 234 N.YS.2d 99 (2d Dep't 1962) (mem.);
Biancoviso v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 320, 137 N.Y.S.2d 773 (2d Dep't 1955);
Every v. Ulster County, 280 App. Div. 155, 112 N.Y.S.2d 367 (3d Dep't 1952) (per curiam),
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Furthermore, there is debate over whether the rule should be
applied in varying degrees to different age groups within the "infant"
designation. While many courts have opted for strict enforcement of
the statutory requirements for those over eighteen years,222 some courts
have felt that even a mature infant should not be held to the same level
of responsibility as an adult, since a legal disability may arise from in-
fancy which is not due to the limitations of understanding of im-
mature infants. 2
23
Against this conflicting background the Court of Appeals, in
Murray v. City of New York, 224 held that allowing a nineteen-year-old
plaintiff to file a late notice of claim for a medical malpractice suit was
not an abuse of discretion where there had been a six-month delay even
though an attorney had been timely retained. The basis of the infant's
motion was that certain information was omitted from the initial
hospital abstract supplied to the attorney, who did not independently
examine the hospital records. The Court stated that "a determination
as to the cognizable relation between infancy and the delay is a matter
committed to the sound discretion of the court... ,"225 predicated on
the facts of each case. Instead of requiring factual demonstration of a
causal connection between the disability and the delay, the Court pre-
sumed that a lack of maturity and understanding of legal rights attends
infancy, 6 and recognized that this impediment may have been an im-
rev'd mem., 304 N.Y. 924, 110 N.E.2d 741, facts found and motion granted, 281 App.
Div. 1060, 122 N.YS.2d 392 (1953); Hogan v. City of Cohoes, 279 App. Div. 282, 110
N.Y.S.2d 3 (3d Dep't 1952). But cf. Anderson v. County of Nassau, 31 App. Div. 2d 761,
297 N.Y.S.2d 665 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.). For an extended survey of the cases, see Young
v. Spencerport Cent. School Dist. #1, 67 Misc. 2d 923, 325 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1971).
222 See, e.g., Hardin v. Village of Akron, 32 App. Div. 2d 610, 299 N.Y.S.2d 92 (4th
Dep't 1969) (mem.); Negrone v. New York City Transit Authority, 15 App. Div. 2d 676,
224 N.Y.S.2d 172 (2d Dep't 1962) (mem.); Schnee v. City of New York, 285 App. Div.
1130, 141 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Ist Dep't 1955) (mem.), afftd mem., 1 N.Y.2d 697, 134 N.E.2d 69,
150 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1956); Nori v. City of Yonkers, 274 App. Div. 545, 85 N.Y.S.2d 131 (2d
Dep't 1948), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 632, 90 N.E.2d 492 (1950).
223 See Every v. Ulster County, 280 App. Div. 155, 156, 112 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (3d
Dep't 1952) (per curiam), rev'd mem., 304 N.Y. 924, 110 N.E.2d 741, facts found and
motion granted, 281 App. Div. 1060, 122 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1953); Nori v. City of Yonkers,
274 App. Div. 545, 550, 85 N.Y.S.2d 131, 136 (2d Dep't 1948) (dissenting opinion) ("The
Legislature did not adopt the proposed exception in favor of immature infants, but did
provide for a limited exception, subject to the discretion of the court, in cases involving
infant claimants.'); Weingard v. City of New York, 124 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1953). The Every court thought that there were many restrictions on the freedom
of legal action which continue until maturity is reached, and that the question of
whether the failure to timely file was due to infancy should be approached liberally.
224 30 N.Y.2d 113, 282 N.E2d 103, 331 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1972).
225 Id. at 119, 282 N.E.2d at 107, 331. N.Y.S.2d at 14, citing Pandoliano v. New York
City Transit Authority, 17 App. Div. 2d 951, 234 N.Y.S.2d 99 (2d Dep't 1962) (mem.).
226 Id. at 120, 282 N.E.2d at 108, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 15, citing Smith v. Meadowbrook
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portant factor in the infant's failure to correct the attorney's mistake.227
The Court felt that wherever the fault might lie, it is the plaintiff who
stands to suffer.2 28
While the Court of Appeals' unanimous affirmance was a refusal
to interfere with the discretion of the lower court, its flexible stand in
permitting this presumption of disability attending infancy increases
the possibility that infants may institute otherwise untimely actions.
In accommodating the plaintiff, the Court also recognized the differ-
ence in treatment afforded to similar fact situations. 229 Judge Breitel,
in concurring, stated that the statute should provide greater discretion
in granting relief because it is presently a "mousetrap" to all but the
most sophisticated practitioners. 230
INSuRAN CE LAw
Ins. Law: Insurer not liable in excess judgment suit where refusal to
defend or settle is based on good faith belief that policy had been
cancelled.
In handling a negligence claim against its policyholder which is in
excess of policy limits, a liability insurer is invariably faced with the
choice of either attempting to negotiate a settlement within policy
limits or proceeding to trial in the hope of absolving its insured from
liability. Because of the conflict between the interests of the insurer and
its insured inherent in this situation, the Court of Appeals early
recognized a duty on the part of the insurer to act in good faith in
carrying out its obligations under the insurance contract. In Brassil v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 231 the insurer was held liable for the expenses
incurred by the insured in prosecuting an appeal which the company
had unjustifiably refused to pursue on his behalf.
Even after Brassil, however, courts often afforded the insurer wide
discretion in deciding whether or not to settle.232 Then, in 1928, the
Hosp., 83 App. Div. 2d 779, 307 N.Y.S.2d 880 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.), aff'd mein., 26
N.Y.2d 997, 259 N.E.2d 499, 311 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1970); Pandoliano v. New York City Transit
Authority, 17 App. Div. 2d 951, 24 N.Y.S.2d 99 (2d Dep't 1962) (mem.).
227 80 N.Y.2d at 120, 282 N.E.2d at 108, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
228 Id., 282 N.E.2d at 107, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
229 Id. at 119, 282 N.E.2d at 107, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
230 Id. at 121, 282 N.E.2d at 108, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
231 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 602 (1914).
232 See, e.g., Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 286 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923);
McAleenan v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 173 App. Div. 100, 159 N.YS. 401 (Ist
Dep't), af'd mnem., 219 N.Y. 563, 114 N.E. 114 (1916); Levin v. New England Cas. Co.,
101 Misc. 402, 166 N.Y.S. 1055 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1917), aff'd mem., 187 App. Div. 935,
174 N.Y.S. 910 (1st Dep't 1919), aff'd memn., 233 N.Y. 631, 135 N.E. 948 (1922).
